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Abstract
When calibrating spatial partial equilibrium models with conjectural variations,
some modelers fit the suppliers’ sales to the available data in addition to total
consumption and price levels. While this certainly enhances the quality of the
calibration, it makes it difficult to accommodate user-imposed bounds on the
model parameters such as restricting the market power parameters to the inter-
val [0,1], which is a common requirement in conjectural variations approaches.
We propose an algorithm to calibrate the suppliers’ sales and simultaneously
deal with user-defined bounds on parameters. To this end, we fix the suppli-
ers’ sales at reference values and obtain the marginal costs for each supplier
and market. We then limit the market power parameters to the interval [0,1],
and calculate intervals of anchor prices and price elasticities that reproduce the
reference supplier sales in the state of equilibrium. If these intervals do not
contain the reference price elasticities and prices, we face a mismatch between
reality and the model mechanics. We resolve this by altering the reference sales
for the critical suppliers, and iterate. Thereby, the user controls whether price
elasticities and anchor prices should be close to their reference values, or the
suppliers’ sales. The algorithm is tested on data from the European gas mar-
ket, and required less than one minute to identify calibrated parameters. Our
algorithm is widely applicable, since it is based on mild (and common) underly-
ing assumptions and can be configured to suit a specific purpose thanks to the
inclusion of user-defined bounds on all relevant parameters.
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1. Introduction
With the advancement in computer technology, an increasing number of
market studies is based on mathematical models. A popular way of model-
ing a network of markets is via a spatial partial equilibrium model including
conjectural variations (CV). However, the calibration problem associated with
these models turns out to be a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Con-
straints (MPEC), as one aims to minimize the deviations between some of the
parameters of the model and their reference values subject to the original equi-
librium problem. Unfortunately, MPECs have a non-convex solution space and
are thus difficult and time-consuming to solve for large models.
An alternative method is used by Lise et al. [18], Cobanli [3] and other
gas market modelers. First, consumption per node and time period is fixed
and, under the assumption of perfectly competitive markets, the nodal prices
are computed. Then the inverse demand functions are derived from predefined
price elasticities and the obtained consumption-price pairs, and the equilibrium
is computed again under the assumption of imperfectly competitive markets;
this reduces consumption and increases price levels. The inverse demand func-
tions are successively shifted outwards until the original consumption levels are
matched.
The resulting nodal prices also depend on the predefined market power pa-
rameters (conjectural parameters) of the suppliers and the price elasticities of
the consumers; some modelers consider these parameters as well to achieve bet-
ter results. Chyong & Hobbs [2] tune the price elasticities while leaving the
market power parameters at their fixed values. While the achieved equilib-
rium is impressively close to what is observed in reality, this method can yield
unrealisticly price-inelastic consumers.
In contrast, Garc´ıa-Alcalde et al. [11], Liu et al. [19] and other electricity
market modelers [21, 20, 5, 17, 6, 4] tune the market power parameters while
leaving price elasticities fixed. The strength of this approach is that the infor-
mation contained in the level and spatial distribution of the sales of the suppliers
is used for calibration, instead of basing the values of the market power param-
eters on the experience of the modeler. On the downside, the marginal supply
costs of each trader have to be known. While this can be approximated by the
production costs in the single-market settings of Garc´ıa-Alcalde et al. [11] and
the other modelers, the task is more difficult in a network of markets, because
transport costs, congestion fees, etc. have to be included. Moreover, the mar-
ket power parameters are allowed to take arbitrary values, even though, in the
absence of cartels, only values between 0 and 1 can be associated with the CV
approach, see for instance Tremblay & Tremblay [22, Chapter 12].
In this work, we propose a new calibration algorithm that bridges these gaps
by finding market power parameters in the interval [0, 1] based on reference
data on sales from individual suppliers to consumers, while maintaining whole-
sale price levels, price elasticities, and nodal consumption within user-defined
bounds.
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2. Calibration Framework
2.1. Oligopolistic market representation
We describe an oligopolistic market by an equilibrium problem comprising
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the optimization problems of the
f¯ traders supplying the market, and the market clearing condition.
0 ≤ −λ− θf
dΛ(s)
ds
qf + φf ⊥ qf ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ F = {f1, . . . , ff¯}. (2.1)
0 ≤ −λ+ Λ(s) ⊥ λ ≥ 0 (2.2)
λ is the market price, θf is the market power parameter of trader f in the
set of all traders F with access to market, Λ(s) is the inverse demand function,
s :=
∑
f∈F
qf is the total consumption in the market, qf is the quantity sold by
trader f , and φf is trader f ’s marginal cost of supplying qf .
We require the inverse demand function Λ(s) to be bijective and have the
following characteristics in its anchor point (s0, λ0):
Λ(s0) = λ0 ≥ 0,
dΛ(s)
ds
∣∣∣∣
s0
=
λ0
s0 · η
< 0, (2.3)
where s0 > 0 is the anchor consumption, λ0 ≥ 0 the anchor price, and η :=
∂s
∂λ
∣∣
λ0
· λ
0
s0 < 0 the price elasticity of demand in (s
0, λ0). While s0, λ0, and η
are subject to calibration, as discussed in the next section, the functional form
of Λ(s) can be freely chosen by the modeler.
2.2. Problem statement
When calibrating CV models, the goal is to tune parameters s0, λ0, η, and
θ, such that the resulting model equilibrium (λ∗, q∗, s∗, φ∗) matches reference
values (λref , qref , sref :=
∑
f∈F
q
ref
f , φ
ref ). θ denotes the vector [θ1, . . . , θf¯ ]
T or
point (θ1, . . . , θf¯ ), depending on context; qf and φf are abbreviated similarly.
In fact, by defining the market power parameters
θf (λ
0, q
ref
f , s
0, φ
ref
f , η) :=
λ0 − φreff
λ0
s0·(−η) · q
ref
f
∀f ∈ F , (2.4)
and setting the anchor parameters s0 = sref , λ0 = λref , and η = ηref , we can
force the equilibrium to be in (λref , qref , sref , φref ) and thereby successfully
terminate the calibration. This can be derived by solving Equation (2.2) for
sref , and substituting (2.2) and (2.3) into (2.1); Liu et al. [19] also follow this
approach.
Calibrating the model in this way may not be possible due to the following
reasons: In contrast to the other parameters and variables, the required reference
marginal supply cost φref is difficult to obtain from data for a network of markets
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due to its dependency on qref and the cost structure of the underlying network;
Furthermore, θf (λ
ref , qreff , s
ref , φreff , η
ref ) is neither guaranteed to be in the
interval [0, 1] for all f ∈ F , nor properly defined for those traders whose sales
q
ref
f = 0.
In the remainder of this section we derive three modules, based on which we
then formulate a calibration algorithm overcoming these difficulties.
• Module I (Section 2.3) introduces how the marginal costs φref of supplying
qref can be determined using the model.
• Module II (Section 2.4) derives ranges on the anchor price λ0 ∈ [λ0, λ0]
and the price elasticity η ∈ [η, η] for which the market power parameters
θf (λ
0, qreff , s
ref , φreff , η) are in the interval [0, 1] for all f ∈ F .
• If these ranges do not contain λref and ηref , we face a basic misalign-
ment between reference data and market equilibria which the model can
generate, and thus have to relax the constraints on the reference values.
In this case we allow any λref ∈ [λref , λref ] and ηref ∈ [ηref , ηref ], and
any equilibrium (λref , qref , sref , φref ) to terminate the calibration, where
λref , λref , ηref , ηref are user-defined bounds on the reference values, for
instance derived from uncertainty inherent to the reference data1. If the
ranges [λ0, λ0] and [η, η] are empty, or do not overlap with [λref , λref ] and
[ηref , ηref ], we also allow changes in qref . Module III (Section 2.5) de-
scribes how a new qref can be found, for which the ranges [λ0, λ0] and
[η, η] are shifted towards [λref , λref ] and [ηref , ηref ].
Module I-III are integrated to a calibration algorithm in Section 2.6. Notation
is introduced as we proceed, and is summarized in Appendix A.
2.3. Module I: Determining the marginal costs φref of supplying the reference
sales of the traders qref
We introduce
0 = qreff − qf ⊥ ξf (free) ∀f ∈ F , (2.5)
which are additional KKT conditions from adding the constraint qf = q
ref
f to
the original optimization problem of each trader f . ξf are the shadow prices
associated with these constraints and therefore also appear in Equation (2.1),
which now reads
0 ≤ −λ− θf
dΛ(s)
ds
qf + φf + ξf ⊥ qf ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ F . (2.6)
1As reference data usually comes with some uncertainty, we would argue that this approach
is legitimate. Alternatively, the cost structure of the network, or the model altogether could
be changed. In this work, however, we do not investigate those options.
4
We solve the augmented model comprising Equations (2.2), (2.5), and (2.6),
choose parameters s0 = sref , λ0 = λref , η = ηref , and any θ  0, where 0 is
the zero vector of appropriate dimension and  is interpreted component-wise.
The variable ξf corresponds to a tax/subsidy imposed on the trader f to supply
the quantity qreff , and compensates for the potential mismatch of supply and
demand in the market caused by our (arbitrary) choice of θ. In equilibrium, the
vector φ reveals the marginal costs of supplying qref , and we obtain φref := φ∗.
2.4. Module II: Determining admissible ranges for the anchor price λ0 and the
price elasticity η
We obtain all values for the anchor price λ0 and the price elasticity η for
which the market power parameters θf (λ
0, qreff , s
ref , φreff , η) are in the interval
[0, 1] for all f ∈ F by exploring the dynamics inherent to the model. Note that
F = F+ ∪ F0 = {f ∈ {F|q
ref
f > 0}} ∪ {f ∈ {F|q
ref
f = 0}}.
For f ∈ F+, and provided θ = θ(λ
0, qref , sref , φref , η), Equation (2.1)
implies that the following equation holds in equilibrium.
λ0 − θf
λ0
sref · (−η)
q
ref
f = φ
ref
f ∀f ∈ F+ (2.7)
Since θf
λ0
sref ·(−η)
q
ref
f is non-negative for all valid choices of λ
0, η, and θf ∈ [0, 1],
we conclude that the wholesale price in equilibrium λ∗ = λ0 is at least as large
as the highest marginal supply cost of the supplying traders.
λ0 ≥ max
f∈F+
φ
ref
f (2.8)
Furthermore, λ0 is at most equal to marginal cost of the supplying trader with
the lowest cost plus its maximum market power markup.
λ0 ≤ φreff + 1 ·
λ0
sref · (−η)
q
ref
f ∀f ∈ F+. (2.9)
We can reformulate condition (2.9) to provide an upper bound on (−η) instead
of λ0:
(−η) ≤ min
f∈F+
λ0
λ0 − φreff
·
q
ref
f
sref
. (2.10)
For f ∈ F0 Equation (2.1) reads
λ0 ≤ φreff , (2.11)
limiting the price in equilibrium λ0 to the lowest marginal cost among the non-
supplying traders with access to the market:
λ0 ≤ min
f∈F0
φ
ref
f . (2.12)
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Summarizing, if we limit θ to the interval [0,1] and consider the properties
(2.3), λ0 and η have to be in the ranges
λ0 := max
f∈F+
φ
ref
f ≤ λ
0 ≤ min
f∈F0
φ
ref
f =: λ
0, (2.13)
(−η) := 0 < (−η) ≤ min
f∈F+
λ0
λ0 − φreff
·
q
ref
f
sref
=: (−η). (2.14)
If the boundary values of the admissible ranges satisfy λ0 ≥ λ0 and (−η) > (−η),
then the equilibrium (λ∗, q∗, s∗, φ∗) = (λ0, qref , sref , φref ) exists, and can be
achieved by choosing any λ0 and η in the ranges [λ0, λ0], [η, η], setting θ = θ(λ0,
q
ref
f , s
ref , φreff , η) for all f ∈ F+, and setting θf to any value in the interval
[0,1] for all f ∈ F0; note that in all cases θf ∈ [0, 1] as desired.
2.5. Module III: Improving the anchor price and price elasticity ranges [λ0, λ0]
and [η, η] by altering the reference sales of the traders
If the anchor price and price elasticity ranges [λ0, λ0] and [η, η] do not inter-
sect with [λref , λref ] and [ηref , ηref ], we know that we cannot achieve the equi-
librium (λref , qref , sref , φref ) without violating λ0 ∈ [λref , λref ], η ∈ [ηref , ηref ],
or θf ∈ [0, 1] for some f ∈ F . We follow a two-step procedure to find a new
equilibrium (λref , qnew , sref , φnew ) for which none of the parameters λ0, η, and
θ violate their respective intervals.
In a first step, we pick a λ0 ∈ [λref , λref ] and η ∈ [ηref , ηref ], which are
as close as possible to [λ0, λ0] and [η, η], respectively. Furthermore, we fix the
anchor consumption s0 at sref . We calculate θf (λ
0, qreff , s
0, φreff , η) =: θ
ref
f for
all f ∈ F+; these values can be outside the interval [0, 1]. Furthermore, we define
θlimf := min(max(θ
ref
f , 0), 1) for all f ∈ F+, and set θ
lim
f =
∑
f ′∈F+
θlim
f′
·qref
f′
qref
f′
for all
f ∈ F0, as reference data does not provide any information on the behavior
of traders f with qreff = 0; other approximations could be used as well. From
Equation (2.1) we estimate the sales in the new equilibrium:
qestf :=
λ0 − φreff
λ0
s0 · (−η)
θlimf
∀f ∈ {F|θlimf > 0}, (2.15a)
qestf := q
ref −
∣∣∣∣∣
λ0 − φreff
λ0
∣∣∣∣∣
s0 · (−η)
1
∀f ∈ {F|θlimf = 0}. (2.15b)
Note that qestf = q
ref
f if θ
ref
f is in the interval [0, 1].
In a second step, we want to find a new equilibrium in the direction of qest .
To this end, we augment the original model by
0 ≤ max
(
q
ref
f , q
est
f
)
− qf ⊥ ξ
F
f ≥ 0 ∀f, (2.16a)
6
0 ≤−min
(
q
ref
f , q
est
f
)
+ qf ⊥ ξ
F
f
≥ 0 ∀f, (2.16b)
0 = s0 − s ⊥ χ (free). (2.16c)
These complementarity constraints are the KKT conditions of additional con-
straints in the traders’ optimization problems. ξ
F
f , ξ
F
f
, and χ are the shadow
prices associated with these constraints and therefore also appear in Equation
(2.1), which now reads
0 ≤ −λ− θlimf
dΛ(s)
ds
qf + φf + ξ
F
f − ξ
F
f
+ χ ⊥ qf ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ F . (2.17)
By solving the augmented model comprising Equations (2.2), (2.16), and (2.17),
with parameters s0 = sref , λ0, η, and θ = θlim , we obtain a new equilibrium
(λ∗ = λ0,q∗ =: qnew ,s∗ = s0,φ∗ =: φnew ). Note that λ∗ = λ0 follows from the
definition of the inverse demand function (2.3) and constraint (2.16c).
2.6. Definition of the calibration algorithm
From the previously introduced modules we can formulate a calibration al-
gorithm for CV models.
• Step 1 (Initialization): Derive reference parameter values λref , ηref , and
qref , as well as upper and lower bounds on these values λref , λref , ηref ,
and ηref , for instance from historical data. Set s0 ≡ sref =
∑
f∈F
q
ref
f , set
the iteration counter i = 1, and define qref ,1 := qref . Apply Module I
(Section 2.3) to calculate φref ,1 from qref ,1.
• Step 2: Calculate [λ0,i, λ0,i] and [ηi, ηi] from φref ,i and qref ,i via Equations
(2.13) and (2.14) (Module II).
• Step 3 (Termination): If [λ0,i, λ0,i] and [ηi, ηi] are non-empty and intersect
with [λref , λref ] and [ηref , ηref ]: Choose λ0,i ∈ [λ0,i, λ0,i] ∩ [λref , λref ],
ηi ∈ [ηi, ηi] ∩ [ηref , ηref ], calculate θi = θ(λ0,i, qref ,i, sref , φref ,i, ηi), and
terminate the calibration. Otherwise, move to Step 4.
• Step 4 (Update): Apply Module III to obtain qref ,i+1 := qnew and φref ,i+1
:= φnew . Update i = i+ 1, and move to Step 2.
Note that this algorithm is only guaranteed to terminate if the interval
[λref , λref ] is chosen large enough with respect to all the reference values given.
Unfortunately, “large enough” is difficult to quantify beforehand. As a conse-
quence, the modeler might prefer to start with λref = λref = λref , and gradually
widen [λref , λref ] for those nodes and time periods stalling the algorithm. Fur-
thermore, a less strict termination criterion can reduce the number of iterations;
for instance |s∗ − sref | ≤ TOL is suitable for most practical purposes, where s∗
is the solution to the model comprising Equations (2.1) and (2.2), and TOL the
maximum allowed deviation to the reference value.
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3. Numerical example
We demonstrate the functionality of the proposed algorithm by applying it
to the gas market model introduced by Baltensperger et al. [1]. The model repre-
sents the European Union (EU) markets and their main suppliers over 2 periods
(summer and winter), consists of 43 nodes and 247 arcs, and is represented by
9432 complementarity conditions (including Equations (2.1) and (2.2)). The
model equations and an exemplary model with two interconnected nodes are
shown in Appendix C. The model and the calibration algorithm were imple-
mented in MATLAB and solved by CPLEX. It takes a quad-core 3.4GHz CPU
5.7 seconds on the average to compute one iteration of the algorithm, whereas
the main computational burden originates from solving the augmented version
of the model in Module III.
Historical data (λdata , qdata , sdata , ηdata) was obtained from various sources
[10, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 23]. As is often the case in practice, the total
consumption did not match the reported sales of the traders sdata 6=
∑
f∈F
qdataf .
A consistent set (λref , qref , sref ≡
∑
f∈F
q
ref
f , η
ref ) was obtained by solving the
augmented version of the model comprising Equations (2.2), (2.16), and (2.17)
before initializing the algorithm. We used λ0nt = λ
data
nt , ηnt = η
data
nt , θfnt = 1
for all f ∈ F , n ∈ N , t ∈ T , where N is the set of all nodes, and T the set of
all time periods. Equations (2.16a) and (2.16b) were altered to constrain qfnt
to the interval [qdatafnt ,∞), if
∑
f∈F
qdatafnt ≤ s
data
nt and
∑
n∈N
qdatafnt ≤
pdataft
1− ˆLOSSft
, where
pdataft is the total quantity produced by trader f in period t, and
ˆLOSSft an
estimate of the lost fraction of gas until it reaches the consumers. Otherwise,
the qdatafnt ’s were scaled down to fit these inequalities, because s
data
nt and p
data
ft
are among the most accurate figures available for the gas market. In other
situations, different parameters might be prioritized. We obtain (λref , qref ,
sref , φref ) = (λ∗ = λdata , q∗, s∗ = sdata , φ∗). For better readability, we drop
subscripts n and t in the following.
In our example, we set λref = λref = λref , ηref = max(−ηref − 0.2, 0.3), and
−ηref = min(−ηref + 0.2, 1). If λ0,i was set to λref in iteration i, we decreased
λref by 0.02 · λref in iteration i + 1; we proceeded similarly when λ0,i hit the
upper bound λref . The algorithm was set to terminate if neither λref nor λref
were changed in an iteration, and |s∗ − sref | ≤ 0.5 million cubic meters per day
(mcm/d).
For the chosen bounds, the algorithm terminates in the 10th iteration. The
main characteristics of the solution are displayed in Table 3.1. Further details
on the results are presented and discussed in Appendix B. The top half of
Table 3.1 illustrates the deviations of the calibrated anchor values λ0,10 and η10
to their reference values. These deviations increase with increasing misalignment
between reference data and market equilibria the model can generate. Further-
more, |qref ,10 − qref | increases with tighter bounds [λref , λref ] and [ηref , ηref ],
and vice versa. Consequently, the modeler can distribute the deviations to
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the parameters of his choice by setting [λref , λref ] and [ηref , ηref ] accordingly.
Note that the infinite relative deviations in qref ,10f and qf originate from some
q
ref ,10
f > 0 and qf > 0 while q
ref
f = 0. The low mean and median deviations
indicate that the algorithm does not bias the results, for instance, towards a
higher or lower average price level.
The lower half of Table 3.1 illustrates that the calibrated parameters λ0,10,
η10, θ(λ0,10, qref ,10, s0, φref ,10, η10) (and s0 = sref ) indeed generate an equi-
librium very close to the desired values (λ0,10, qref ,10, s0, φref ,10), which proves
that the proposed algorithm works as intended when applied in practice.
Table 3.1: The upper rows display the deviations between parameters λ0,10, qref ,10
f
,
and−η10, and their reference values. The lower rows show the deviations between the
equilibrium values of the calibrated model and the calibrated parameters. Quantities
are given in million cubic meters per day (mcm/d), prices in thousand Euros per
million cubic meters (ke/mcm), and price elasticities are unitless.
Parameter / Deviation between values
variable min |max, abs. min |max, rel. mean median
λ0,10 λref -23.2 |39.4 ke/mcm -7.56 |16.8% -0.34 ke/mcm 0.00 ke/mcm
−η10 −ηref -0.20 |0.20 -37.4 |59.0% -0.01 0.00
q
ref ,10
f q
ref
f -17.5 |17.5
mcm/d -100 |∞% 0.00mcm/d 0.00mcm/d
s∗ sref -0.03 |0.41mcm/d -0.03 |0.25% 0.00mcm/d 0.00mcm/d
λ∗ λ0,10 -3.15 |0.26 ke/mcm -0.83 |0.07% -0.05 ke/mcm 0.05 ke/mcm
q∗f q
ref ,10
f -0.07 |0.05mcm/d -39.3 |∞% 0.00mcm/d 0.00mcm/d
Note that our algorithm reproduces the rudimentary algorithm introduced
in Section 2.2 in the first iteration, if [λref , λref ] := [0,∞) and [ηref , ηref ] :=
(−∞, 0) are chosen. In this light, our algorithm is a significant extension, as it
finds a solution with θ in the interval [0,1], and highlights the interplay between
the parameters, which allows the user to take informed decisions on how the
mismatch between model and reality is resolved.
4. Summary and Outlook
We propose an iterative algorithm to calibrate conjectural variations mod-
els for a network of markets. The algorithm builds upon three modules. In
Module I, the marginal supply costs φf are derived for all traders f from the
sales qref of the traders and the cost structure of the network. In Module II,
all anchor prices λ0 ∈ [λ0, λ0] and price elasticities η ∈ [η, η], which enable the
equilibrium of the model to be in a certain point, are explored. In Module III,
a new consistent and physically feasible set of sales qnew is obtained, which
9
changes the marginal costs of supply φ such that the ranges [λ0, λ0] and [η, η]
are shifted in a desired direction.
The example indicates that the algorithm is able to calibrate a network of
markets to real world data fast after a small number of iterations. The presented
algorithm is broadly applicable, since the assumptions on which it is based are
very mild and common in spatial partial equilibrium modeling. Furthermore,
the algorithm can easily be configured to specific purposes, since the reference
values and their tolerances can be chosen by the user. Finally, the algorithm
can easily be expanded; for instance, one could follow the approach taken by
Huppmann & Egging [12] and (manually) adjust the underlying marginal cost
parameters of specific system services to provoke a more favorable outcome of
the sales per trader.
Future work should emphasize on extending the update step of the algo-
rithm, such that the sizes of the ranges of the various reference values can be
weighed against each other and adjusted accordingly. In order to further in-
crease the plausibility of the outcome with respect to economic theory, we also
aim to improve how the algorithm sets these ranges relatively to each other. For
instance, the market power parameters could be restricted to be larger in the
high demand season than in the low demand season. Furthermore, we expect
to achieve a reduction of iterations by exploiting the problem structure even
further, particularly when determining the new set of sales per trader qnew in
the update step.
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Appendix A. Calibration algorithm specific notation
Table A.1: Variables, parameters, and functions.
Abbr. Explanation
qf Gas shipment of trader f
pf Total production of trader f
s Total consumption
η Price elasticity of demand
θf Market power parameter of trader f
λ Wholesale market price
Λ Inverse demand function
φf Marginal cost of trader f to supply quantity qf
ξ
F
f Shadow price of enforcing an upper level on trader f ’s sales qf
ξF
f
Shadow price of enforcing an lower level on on trader f ’s sales qf
χ Shadow price of enforcing consumption level s0
11
Table A.2: Sub- and superscripts.
Abbr. Explanation
(·)f Parameter/variable of trader f
(·)n Parameter/variable in node n
(·)t Parameter/variable in time period t
(·)0 Anchor value for inverse demand function
(·)∗ Value of variable in equilibrium
(·)ref Reference value for calibration
(·)data Reference data, for instance based on historical values
(·)est Estimated variable
(·)new Updated variable
(·)i Parameter/variable in iteration i
(·) upper bound on parameter/variable
(·) lower bound on parameter/variable
Table A.3: Models and sets.
Abbr. Explanation
F Set of all traders
F+ Set of traders selling gas; F+ = {F|qf > 0}
F0 Set of traders present in the market but not selling gas; F0 =
{F|qf = 0}
N Set of all nodes/markets
T Set of all time periods
12
Appendix B. In-depth analysis of results
As Figure B.1 depicts, the supplier’s market shares after calibration
q10f
sref
(lowermost bar in each country) are close to the reference values
qref ,1
f
sref
(topmost
bar in each country) for most countries. We find the largest deviations between
q10f
sref and
qref ,1
f
sref in countries with rather low overall consumption such as Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland; see
Table B.1 for consumption values sref . At the same time, deviations are com-
parably low for the largest EU consumers Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom,
France, and the Netherlands. We explain the dependency on the market size
as follows: The calibration aims at finding a combination of φref , λ0, and qref ,
which produces an equilibrium in itself. Therefore, the algorithm shifts the mar-
ket shares
qref
f
sref for some f over the course of the iterations (Equation (2.15)).
These impact the marginal supply costs φref of all traders, but first and fore-
most of those traders f whose market shares
qref
f
sref
are shifted. Once φreff leads to
intersecting ranges [λ0, λ0] and [λref , λref ], Equation (2.15) outputs qest = qref ,
and
qref
f
sref
stops shifting. Consequently, the largest shifts in market shares oc-
cur in those countries in which changes in
qref
f
sref have the lowest impact on the
marginal costs φref and therefore the range [λ0, λ0], which are countries with low
consumption compared to the total production of their supplier, the available
pipeline capacity for imports, and the regasification capacity.
Furthermore, we observe that the changes from
qref ,i+1
f
sref
to
qref ,i
f
sref
are generally
the largest in the first few iterations and decrease thereafter. Large changes
indicate that the anchor price λ0,i changes, since this impacts the equilibrium
heavily. This can be confirmed with help of Table B.1: for the example of
Portugal in October-March, λ
0,10
λref
= 315
ke/mcm
275 ke/mcm ≈ 1.15, and as we increase λ
ref
by 2% in the iteration i + 1 if λ0,i = λref (Section 3), it is safe to assume
that λ0,i+1 = 1 + 0.02 · i · λref for iterations i ∈ {1, . . . , 7}, and only stagnates
thereafter. This is confirmed by the stagnating shares of Portugal after iteration
i = 7 (Figure B.1).
We learn from Table B.1 that anchor prices λ0,10 are overall slightly higher
in the European winter than during summer. This intuitively makes sense, since
consumption sref is clearly higher in winter than in summer, while production
capacities remain unchanged, and therefore gas is scarcer. For the price elas-
ticities η10 we do not observe such a clear trend, but note that the η10 remain
close to reference values ηref for the larger consumers United Kingdom, France,
the Netherlands, and Spain. In Italy, (−η10) is very low in both seasons. This
is a consequence of the high wholesale prices λref compared to the marginal
supply costs φref of the traders (Equation (2.10)). The algorithm concludes
from this difference that consumers in Italy are willing to buy gas at high prices
and therefore assigns low (−η) and high market power parameters (Tables B.2
and B.3), which coincides with the interpretation an economist would make
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Figure B.1: Development of the market shares of all traders in all markets. For
each country, a group of 10+1 bars is displayed, and each bar is divided into at
most 17 sections. From top to bottom, the bars show the market shares
q
ref ,i
f
sref
of the
suppliers in the iterations i ∈ {1, . . . , 10}. The lowermost bar represents the market
shares in the calibrated equilibrium
q10f
sref
.
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Table B.1: Reference consumption sref , reference price λref , and reference price
elasticity ηref , as well as the calibrated anchor consumption s0, price λ0,10 and
price elasticity η10. Quantities are given in million cubic meters per day (mcm/d),
prices in thousand Euros per million cubic meters (ke/mcm), and price elasticities
are unitless. λ0,10 and η10 above their respective references are colored red with
increasing absolute value, and below below their respective references blue with
decreasing value, to visually underpin our findings.
October-March April-September
sref , s0 λref λ0,10 ηref η10 sref , s0 λref λ0,10 ηref η10
[mcm/d] [ke/mcm] [ke/mcm] [-] [-] [mcm/d] [ke/mcm] [ke/mcm] [-] [-]
Austria 34 354 349 -0.47 -0.35 16 354 354 -0.47 -0.30
Belgium 62 315 302 -0.44 -0.34 39 315 315 -0.44 -0.30
Bulgaria 10 413 392 -0.43 -0.30 6 413 389 -0.43 -0.30
Croatia 11 376 380 -0.44 -0.44 7 376 372 -0.44 -0.41
Czech Republic 34 291 313 -0.34 -0.34 13 291 291 -0.34 -0.54
Denmark 13 305 307 -0.40 -0.40 8 305 305 -0.40 -0.60
Estonia 3 381 381 -0.43 -0.63 2 381 381 -0.43 -0.63
Finland 14 381 373 -0.50 -0.50 9 381 373 -0.50 -0.50
France 189 333 333 -0.32 -0.32 71 333 331 -0.32 -0.30
Germany 287 305 305 -0.41 -0.61 161 305 301 -0.41 -0.30
Greece 14 383 382 -0.60 -0.42 12 383 365 -0.60 -0.47
Hungary 42 337 343 -0.35 -0.35 17 337 327 -0.35 -0.30
Ireland 15 298 306 -0.57 -0.58 13 298 295 -0.57 -0.38
Italy 286 376 375 -0.47 -0.31 161 376 376 -0.47 -0.30
Latvia 6 377 377 -0.35 -0.55 2 377 377 -0.35 -0.55
Lithuania 9 421 421 -0.53 -0.73 5 421 421 -0.53 -0.73
Luxembourg 4 315 314 -0.45 -0.30 3 315 314 -0.45 -0.45
The Netherlands 142 301 318 -0.46 -0.46 80 301 306 -0.46 -0.46
Poland 55 301 278 -0.37 -0.35 34 301 284 -0.37 -0.30
Portugal 14 275 315 -0.46 -0.46 14 275 302 -0.46 -0.46
Romania 42 177 207 -0.43 -0.43 31 177 177 -0.43 -0.63
Slovakia 21 345 333 -0.42 -0.30 8 345 333 -0.42 -0.30
Slovenia 3 376 368 -0.40 -0.38 2 376 354 -0.40 -0.32
Spain 102 294 316 -0.45 -0.45 85 294 303 -0.45 -0.45
Sweden 5 305 309 -0.53 -0.53 2 305 305 -0.53 -0.33
Switzerland 11 305 305 -0.30 -0.30 4 305 303 -0.30 -0.30
United Kingdom 256 298 301 -0.44 -0.44 158 298 299 -0.44 -0.44
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when analyzing such a situation. In Germany, we face a special situation: from
October to March, (−η) is capped at its maximum value, while the opposite is
true for April to September. As previously, this result originates from the given
reference data. We do not judge at this point whether the outcome is realistic
from an economic point of view; instead we emphasize that the algorithm allows
the modeler to set the ranges [ηref , ηref ] such that the outcome is defensible.
Table B.2: Market power parameter values for all traders (T) in all markets (C)
in October-March. The country abbreviations are given in Table B.4. Algeria and
Norway supply the EU via the pipeline network and via liquefied natural gas (LNG)
shipments. This is distinguished by N and L, respectively. Figures above 0.5 are
colored red with increasing value, and below 0.5 green with decreasing value, to
visually underpin our findings.
❍
❍
❍C
T
AZ DK DZL DZN EG GB LY NG NL NOL NON OM PE QA RU TT YE
AT 0.46 0.41 0.40 0.42 0.46 0.38 1 0.83 0.43 0 0.41 0.46 0.46 0.17 0.59 0.22 0.46
BE 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.09 1 0.09 0.09
BG 0.41 1 1 1 0.41 1 1 0.84 0.88 0.41 0.66 0.41 0.41 0.78 0.19 0.41 0.41
HR 0.69 1 0.83 0.82 0.69 0.55 0.36 0.35 0.64 0.69 0.76 0.69 0.69 0.25 0.83 0.69 0.69
CZ 0.14 0.14 0.14 0 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.28 0.14 0.14
DK 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.32 0.14 0.14
EE 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
FI 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
FR 0.27 0.19 0.11 0.12 0.27 0.21 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.40 0.27 0.27 0.11 0.54 0.98 0.27
DE 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.03 0.30 0.15 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.30
GR 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.66 1 0.80 0.62 0.44 0.68 0.54 0.65 0.65 0.71 0.73 0.62 0.60 1
HU 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.30 0.08 0 0.30 0.11 0.30 0.16 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.30
IE 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.09 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.93 0.22 0.22
IT 0.72 0.98 1 0.53 0.83 0.73 0.85 1 0.66 0.98 0.58 0 0.98 0.84 0.63 0.99 0.62
LV 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
LT 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
LU 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.03 0.13 0.13 0.03 0.13 0.24 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.13
NL 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.11 0.23 0.23 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.23 0.23 0 0.40 0.23 0.23
PL 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.11 0.20 0.20
PT 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0 0.07 0.07 0.07
RO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SK 0.22 0.22 0.22 1 0.22 0.60 0.75 0.22 0.37 0.22 1 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.13 0.22 0.22
SI 0.57 0.10 0.46 0.99 0.57 0.98 0.56 0.45 0.98 0.22 1 0.57 0 0.48 0.85 0.42 0.57
ES 0.09 0.09 0 0.21 0.09 0.09 0.09 0 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.01 0 0.09 0.09
SE 0.15 0 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.04 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.72 0.15 0.15
CH 0.15 0.15 0.15 1 0.15 0.15 0.24 0.15 0 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.26 0.15 0.15
GB 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.17 0.17 0 0.17 0.01 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.40 0.17 0.17
Tables B.2 and B.3 show that the market power parameters θ are similar per
country and not per trader, for instance, Italy faces high θ, whereas Romania
faces very low θ. This originates from the fact that the inverse demand function
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Table B.3: Market power parameter values for all traders (T) in all markets (C)
in April-September. The country abbreviations are given in Table B.4. Algeria
and Norway supply the EU via the pipeline network and via LNG shipments. This
is distinguished by N and L, respectively. Figures above 0.5 are colored red with
increasing value, and below 0.5 green with decreasing value, to visually underpin our
findings.
❍
❍
❍C
T
AZ DK DZL DZN EG GB LY NG NL NOL NON OM PE QA RU TT YE
AT 0.74 0.47 0.52 0.73 0.74 0.93 0.85 0.57 0.94 1 0.84 0.74 1 0.94 0.72 0.50 0.74
BE 0.34 1 0.40 1 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.60 0.16 0.34 0.15 0.34 0.34 0.56 1 0.34 0.34
BG 0.61 1 1 1 0.61 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.61 0.61 1 0.28 1 0.61
HR 0.94 0.66 0.81 1 0.94 0.99 0.98 0.69 1 0.94 0.99 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.25 0.94
CZ 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.14 0.34 0.11 0.34 0.34 0.15 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.79 0.34 0.34
DK 0.55 0.36 0.42 0.86 0.55 0.44 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.74 0.55 0.55 0.14 0.93 0.55 0.55
EE 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37
FI 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
FR 0.51 0.90 0.20 0.97 0.51 0.98 0.73 0.94 0.98 0.67 0.19 0.51 0.07 0.97 1 0.87 0.51
DE 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.57 0.32 1 0.32 0.32 0.18 0.32 0.20 0.32 0.32 1 0.26 0.32 0.32
GR 0.78 0.78 0.97 0.72 0.28 0.63 0.44 0.93 0.72 0.63 0.79 0 0.75 1 0.88 0.73 0.09
HU 0.38 0.38 0.38 1 0.38 0.82 1 0.38 1 0.38 1 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.19 0.38 0.38
IE 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.10 0.28 0.28 0.94 0.28 0.69 0.28 0.28 0.28 1 0.28 0.28
IT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LV 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
LT 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
LU 0.48 0.22 0.42 0.10 0.48 0.73 0.37 0.36 0.77 0.48 0.87 0.48 0.48 0.33 0.80 0.48 0.48
NL 0.42 0 0.26 0.16 0.42 0.33 0.42 0.40 0.44 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.23 0.63 0.42 0.42
PL 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.34 0.27 1 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.14 0.27 0.27
PT 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.30 0.14 0.14 0.14 0 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.14
RO 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
SK 0.48 1 1 1 0.48 0.80 1 1 1 0.48 1 0.48 0.48 1 0.22 0.48 0.48
SI 0.64 0.58 0.68 0.93 0.64 0.84 0.89 0.60 0.86 0.03 0.88 0.64 0 0.73 1 0.41 0.64
ES 0.17 0.17 0.07 0.50 0.17 0.17 0.17 0 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.17
SE 0.25 0.03 0.25 0.12 0.25 0.16 0.25 0.25 0.16 0.25 1 0.25 0.25 0.49 0.99 0.25 0.25
CH 0.37 0.37 0.88 1 0.37 0.62 0.28 0.37 0.11 0.37 0.40 0.37 0.37 0.94 0.46 0.37 0.37
GB 0.39 0.39 0.86 0 0.39 0.77 0.39 0.39 0.47 0.39 0.17 0.39 0.39 0.07 0.79 0.39 0.39
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Table B.4: Country abbreviations. The attribution of a country into the “East-
ern EU” or “Western EU” is determined by its geographical location and does not
coincide with the historical political division of Europe.
Eastern EU Western EU Non-EU
consumers consumers suppliers
BG Bulgaria AT Austria AZ Azerbaijan
CZ Czech Republic BE Belgium DZL Algeria (LNG)
EE Estonia CH Switzerland DZN Algeria
(Pipeline)
FI Finland DE Germany EG Egypt
GR Greece DK Denmark LY Libya
HR Croatia ES Spain NG Nigeria
HU Hungary FR France NOL Norway (LNG)
LT Lithuania GB United King-
dom
NON Norway
(Pipeline)
LV Latvia IE Ireland OM Oman
PL Poland IT Italy PE Peru
RO Romania LU Luxembourg QA Qatar
SI Slovenia NL The Nether-
lands
RU Russia
SK Slovakia PT Portugal TT Trinidad & To-
bago
SE Sweden YE Yemen
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is equal for all traders, whereas the marginal supply costs φ vary per trader and
country. The highest mean values were found for the large pipeline-bound sup-
pliers Russia (0.50), AlgeriaN (0.46), NorwayN (0.44), United Kingdom (0.43),
Libya (0.41), and the Netherlands (0.40), which mirrors the observations we
make in reality.
Moreover, the θ’s are generally higher in the European summer than in
winter, which is rather counter-intuitive from an economic point of view; one
would expect traders to exert less market power in times demand and prices are
low. However, this finding can be explained by the interplay of the market power
parameters θ and λ0. On one hand, Equation (2.4) implies that for non-zero
reference sales qreff the market power θf of a trader f increases with increasing
difference between the market price and its marginal supply costs λ0 − φf . On
the other hand, if [λ0, λ0] ∪ [λref , λref ] contains more than one point, and qref ,
sref , φref , and ηref are given and fixed, the choice of λ0 determines the θf , and
any combination of λ0 ∈ [λref , λref ] and θf (λ0, q
ref
f , s
ref , φ
ref
f , η
ref ) ∈ [0, 1] is
admissible. This renders a certain flexibility when choosing the parameters and
the corresponding outcome. In our example, we chose reference prices λref to
be equal per country in the summer and winter periods. This corresponds to
fixing a rather low λ0 ∈ [λ0, λ0]∪ [λref , λref ] for the winter period, and a rather
high λ0 ∈ [λ0, λ0] ∪ [λref , λref ] for the summer period. As a consequence, our
calibration gives rather low θ’s in winter and rather high θ’s in summer. We
carried out additional simulations, for which the results are not shown here, with
a spread of 10% and 20% between summer and winter reference prices. For the
former setting, the average θ is similar in both seasons, while in the latter the
average θ is clearly higher in the high demand period. We conclude that the
reference data greatly influences the obtained equilibrium and the corresponding
parameters, and therefore should be carefully chosen.
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Appendix C. Model equations and exemplary market setting
Appendix C is largely reproduced from Baltensperger et al. [1]. We intro-
duce the model equations in Appendix C.1, show an exemplary market setting
with two interconnected nodes in Appendix C.2, and introduce the associated
notation in Appendix C.3. Note that we follow the convention used by Bal-
tensperger et al. [1] and include producers in the notion of service providers,
although producers are not an infrastructure service.
Appendix C.1. Model equations
Equations (C.1) describe the mechanics of the spatial partial equilibrium
model of the European gas market in detail. We refrain from showing the loss
terms in the equations to achieve a more compact notation.
0 ≤ LINCPnt +QUAC
P
ntq
P
fnt + α
P
nt + α
PT
n − φ
N
fnt ⊥ q
P
fnt ≥ 0 ∀f, n, t
(C.1a)
0 ≤ LINC Int + α
I
nt + α
IT
n + φ
N
fnt − φ
S
fn ⊥ q
I
fnt ≥ 0 ∀f, n, t
(C.1b)
0 ≤ LINCXzt + α
X
nt + α
XT
n − φ
N
fnt + φ
S
fn ⊥ q
X
fnt ≥ 0 ∀f, n, t
(C.1c)
0 ≤ LINCAnmt + α
A
nmt + α
AT
nm − φ
N
fmt + φ
N
fnt ⊥ q
A
fnmt ≥ 0 ∀f, n,m, t
(C.1d)
0 ≤LINCLnt + α
L
nt + α
LT
n + LINC
B
nmt + α
B
nmt + α
BT
nm
+LINCRmt + α
R
mt + α
RT
m − φ
N
fmt + φ
N
fnt ⊥ q
B
fnmt ≥ 0 ∀f, n,m, t
(C.1e)
0 ≤ −λCnt − θ
C
fntSLP
C
ntq
C
fnt + φ
N
fnt ⊥ q
C
fnt ≥ 0 ∀f, n, t
(C.1f)
0 ≤ qPfnt + q
X
fnt +
∑
m∈A(n)
qAfmnt +
∑
m∈B(n)
qBfmnt
−qIfnt − q
C
fnt −
∑
m∈A(n)
qAfnmt −
∑
m∈B(n)
qBfnmt ⊥ φ
N
fnt ≥ 0 ∀f, n, t
(C.1g)
0 ≤
∑
t∈T
qIfnt −
∑
t∈T
qXfnt ⊥ φ
S
fn ≥ 0 ∀f, n
(C.1h)
0 ≤ CAP
Z
zt −
∑
f∈F(z)
qZfzt ⊥ α
Z
zt ≥ 0 ∀z, t
(C.1i)
0 ≤ CAP
ZT
z −
∑
t∈T
∑
f∈F(z)
qZfzt ⊥ α
ZT
z ≥ 0 ∀z (C.1j)
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0 ≤ λCnt −

INTCnt + SLPCnt
∑
f∈F(n)
qCfnt

 ⊥ λCnt ≥ 0 ∀n, t
(C.1k)
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Appendix C.2. Graphical illustration
Figure C.1: Gas market model with two nodes. P : producer. A: pipeline operator.
L: liquefaction plant operator. B: LNG shipment. R: regasification plant operator.
S: storage operator. C: consumer. Fn: trader associated with producer Pn. Fm:
trader associated with producer Pm. qPfnt: quantity delivered from producer to
trader f at node n in time period t. qA
fnmt
: pipeline transportation of trader f via
arc nm in period t. qB
fnmt
: LNG shipment of trader f via arc nm in period t. qI
fnt
:
storage injection by trader f at node n in period t. qX
fnt
: storage extraction by trader
f at node n in period t. qC
fnt
: sales by trader f to consumer in node n in period t.
The traders Fn and Fm, there decision variables, and their corresponding producers
Pn and Pm are colored red (n) and blue (m), respectively. Service providers, except
producers, and flows between them are marked purple, as well as the consumers,
since all traders trade with them.
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Appendix C.3. Notation
Table C.1: This table introduces the nomenclature concerning service providers,
traders and consumers.
Service providers, traders and consumers
Anm Transmission system operator of pipeline nm
Bnm Shipping company transporting LNG from n to m
Cn Consumer at node n
In Storage operator injecting gas at node n
Ln Liquefaction plant operator at node n
Pn Gas producing company at node n
Rn Regasification plant operator at node n
Sn Storage operator at node n
Fn The trader associated with producer at node n
Xn Storage operator extracting gas at node n
Zz Placeholder for a service provider (Pn, In, Xn, Ln, Rn, Anm, Bnm)
at node n / arc nm
Table C.2: This table introduces all sets used for the mathematical description of
the model.
Sets
t ∈ T = {T1, . . . , Tt¯} A time period t in the set T of all periods of
a year
n,m ∈ N = {N1, . . . , Nn¯} Nodes n,m in the set N of all nodes
f ∈ F = {F1, . . . , Fn¯} A trader f in the set F of all traders
z ∈ Z A node/arc element from the set Z
A ⊂ N ×N Set of arcs connecting 2 nodes by pipeline
B ⊂ N ×N Set of arcs connecting 2 nodes by ship
C ⊆ N Set of nodes at which a consumer is active
I ⊆ N Set of nodes at which storage injection is pos-
sible
L ⊆ N Set of nodes at which a liquefaction terminal
operator is active
Continued on next page
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Table C.2 – Continued from previous page
Sets
P ⊆ N Set of nodes at which a gas producer is active
R ⊆ N Set of nodes at which a regasification terminal
operator is active
X ⊆ N Set of nodes at which storage extraction is
possible
Z ∈ {P ,L,B,R,A, I,X} Placeholder for the set of nodes/arcs at which
a type of service provider is active
A(n) ⊆ N \ {n} Set of nodes which are connected to n by
pipeline
B(n) ⊆ N \ {n} Set of nodes which are connected to n by ship
C(f) ⊆ N The set of all nodes with consumers which are
reachable by trader f
N (f) ⊆ N The set of all nodes which are reachable by
trader f
F(z) The set of all traders active at node/arc z
Z(f) The set of all nodes/arcs in which service Z
is active and are reachable by trader f
Table C.3: The parameters are generally described by capital Roman letters.
Lower-case Roman letters are only chosen if the parameter is directly linked to a
variable of the same name. Occasionally, lower-case Greek letters are chosen to fol-
low conventions. The superscripts indicate whether the parameter is related to a
service provider of type Z ∈ {P, L,B,R,A, I,X} or a consumer C. Subscripts indi-
cate the trader f , node/arc z, and the period of the year t the parameter is related
to.
Parameters
CAP
Z
nt Maximum capacity of service Z located at z in period t
CAP
ZT
n Maximum capacity of service Z located at z over all periods T
INTCnt Maximum willingness to pay (intercept of inverse demand func-
tion with the sCnt = 0 - axis) of consumers at node n in period t
LINCZzt Linear cost function term for service Z located at z in period t
LOSSZz Loss factor when using service Z located at z
QUACZzt Quadratic cost function term for service Z located at z in
period t
SLPCnt Slope of the inverse demand curve of the consumers at node n
in period t, is assumed strictly negative
Continued on next page
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Table C.3 – Continued from previous page
Parameters
θfnt Market power parameter of trader f in node n and period t
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Table C.4: The variables are described by lowercase letters. Primal variables are
Roman, while dual variables are Greek letters. The superscripts indicate whether the
variable is related to a service provider of type Z ∈ {P, L,B,R,A, I,X}, a consumer
C, or a node N . Subscripts indicate the trader f the variable corresponds to, at
which node/arc z the transaction or service is located, and in which period of the
year t it takes place.
Variables
qCfnt Flow of trader f to consumer C at node n in period t
qZfzt Flow between trader f and service provider Z at node/arc z in
period t
αZzt Congestion fee of service Z located at z in period t
αZTz Congestion fee on annual usage of service Z located at z
φNfnt Dual variable of the volume balance of trader f at node n and
period t
φSfn Dual variable of the annual volume balance of trader f in storage
S at node n
λCnt Wholesale price at node n in period t
Table C.5: This table introduces the functions. The superscript C indicates that
the function is related to the wholesale market. Subscripts indicate at which node n
and in which period of the year t the function is valid.
Functions
ΛCnt(s
C
nt) Inverse demand function of consumer C at node n in period t.
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